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Framing and Interorganizational Knowledge Transfer:  
A Process Study of Collaborative Innovation in the Aircraft Industry 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article explains how and why organizational actors’ decisions about interorganizational 
knowledge transfer might change over time. We find that organizational actors’ framing of 
future innovation developments, as either an opportunity or a threat, motivates them to engage 
or disengage in interorganizational knowledge transfer activities. Shifts in framing lead 
organizational actors to leverage their relational context and knowledge base in new ways, 
thereby emphasizing the role of agency in drawing upon these structures. These findings are 
incorporated into a process model that explains discontinuous change in interorganizational 
knowledge transfer. 
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When organizational actors share and trade knowledge in interorganizational collaborations 
they do so because of the benefits of knowledge transfer, such as enhanced innovativeness 
(Powell et al., 1996; Van Wijk et al., 2008). But we also know that actors prevent or reduce 
knowledge transfer to avoid spillovers of critical know-how (Khanna et al., 1998; Norman, 
2004). A theory of interorganizational knowledge transfer therefore needs to explain both 
decisions of organizations to initiate or intensify as well as decisions to reduce or terminate 
knowledge transfer. However, currently we lack proper understanding of how these decisions 
can change over time.  
 In this paper, we develop such an explanation of the dynamics of interorganizational 
knowledge transfer over time. Most research into interorganizational knowledge transfer uses 
cross-sectional methods to explain the amount of knowledge transfer in a given partnership 
(Meier, 2011; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011; Van Wijk et al., 2008). Thus, existing 
explanations focus mainly on the characteristics of the organizational actors engaged in 
knowledge transfer (e.g., willingness to share, absorptive capacity), the nature of their 
relationships (e.g., relationship quality, governance mechanisms), and the knowledge involved 
(e.g., tacitness) (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Meier, 2011). Yet, these cross-sectional studies 
have not traced or explained decisions of organizations to initiate, intensify, reduce or 
terminate knowledge transfer. Understanding such changes over time is important, especially 
in the protracted and emergent journey of an innovation process (Van de Ven et al., 1999), 
involving multitudinous decisions on knowledge transfer. Therefore, we address the following 
research question: How and why do organizational actors’ decisions about 
interorganizational knowledge transfer change over time? 
 To address this question, we undertook a longitudinal study of the development of a new 
class of aircraft materials, fiber metal laminates (FML), whose development spanned more 
than two decades of knowledge transfer interactions, involving more than 20 organizations. 
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Using a process study (Langley, 1999; Van de Ven, 2007), we investigate patterns in 
knowledge transfer over time. The analyses show that decisions to initiate, intensify, reduce or 
terminate knowledge transfer often depend on the framing of future innovation developments, 
whether as opportunity or threat. Therefore, we invoke cognitive framing theory to explain 
actions on the basis of the way managers and organizations make sense of their environment 
(Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Kaplan, 2011).  
 In turn, our findings contribute to current theory on knowledge transfer and cognitive 
framing in three ways. First, we explain how discontinuous changes in interorganizational 
knowledge transfer (i.e., initiating, intensifying, reducing, or terminating knowledge sharing) 
are shaped by the actors’ future-oriented framing of the innovation. These frames are both 
long-term oriented and variable, such that changes in their framing motivate actors to adjust 
their interorganizational knowledge transfer activities. Second, the shifts in framing also lead 
organizational actors to leverage their relational context and knowledge base in new ways, 
thus emphasizing the role of agency instead of knowledge transfer solely determined by these 
antecedents. Accordingly, we clarify the dynamics of interorganizational knowledge transfer 
by explaining why and when organizational actors might decide to initiate, intensify, reduce or 
terminate their knowledge transfer interactions with existing and new partners. Third, our 
findings extend cognitive framing theory by demonstrating the influence of not only threat and 
opportunity frames on decision-making, but also that of unframing opportunities.   
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Firms need interorganizational connections to gain access to complementary knowledge 
resources. Both vertical (buyers and suppliers) and horizontal (competitors or other partners) 
collaborations are valuable: Customers can help define market needs (Von Hippel, 1986), 
suppliers provide long-term access to specialized and complementary assets (Lipparini et al., 
in press; Van Echtelt et al., 2008), and competitors offer opportunities to learn new skills and 
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access to needed assets (Ahuja, 2000; Mowery et al., 1996). We thus define 
interorganizational knowledge transfer broadly, as the process by which organizations 
exchange knowledge, receive knowledge, and are influenced by the knowledge of others 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Phelps et al., 2012; Van Wijk et al., 2008).  
Following prior studies and reviews (Argote et al., 2003; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; 
Inkpen, 2002; Meier, 2011; Phelps et al., 2012), we model interorganizational knowledge 
transfer as a process that involves organizational actors as sources and recipients, influenced 
by their relationships and the characteristics of the knowledge. A single organization may 
participate as both a knowledge source and a knowledge recipient, because interorganizational 
knowledge transfer is often reciprocal (Kachra and White, 2008; Lipparini et al., in press) and 
may involve frequent interactions to integrate more tacit knowledge for the joint development 
of new knowledge (Hardy et al., 2003). We acknowledge that the concept of knowledge 
transfer seems to reify knowledge as an entity, but we follow others in using this concept as a 
shorthand expression for a process that is more complex and interactive (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008; Huxham and Hibbert, 2008). 
 Prior studies explored the effects of relational, knowledge, and organizational 
characteristics on interorganizational knowledge transfer, typically as antecedents that might 
explain variance in the amount of knowledge transfer in a given alliance. In studies that focus 
on interorganizational knowledge transfer, most attention centers on the effects of the 
relational context, including relationship quality and governance mechanisms (Phelps et al., 
2012). High quality relationships – often referred to as strong ties – are characterized by trust 
and shared understanding, and increase the amount of knowledge sharing in established 
collaborations (Becerra et al., 2008; Kale et al., 2000; Van Wijk et al., 2008; Yli-Renko et al., 
2001). Arduous relationships and conflict instead offer negative antecedents of knowledge 
transfer (Ko et al., 2005; Tsang et al., 2004). Moreover, strong ties predict renewed 
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cooperation in the future (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Powell et al., 1996). Finally, knowledge 
alliances likely result in positive learning outcomes when partners have appropriate 
governance mechanisms, such as formal contracts, to enable both knowledge sharing and 
knowledge protection (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Mohr and Sengupta, 2002; Parmigiani and 
Rivera-Santos, 2011). 
 Characteristics of the organizations’ knowledge base also influence knowledge transfer 
(Van Wijk et al., 2008). In particular, the tacitness of partner knowledge hampers 
interorganizational knowledge transfer, because tacit knowledge requires more intensive 
interactions before it can be understood and incorporated (Becerra et al., 2008). Further, the 
formal appropriability of knowledge, as established by intellectual property rights (IPR) such 
as patents or copyright protection, enables firms to share knowledge while retaining the right 
to appropriate its commercial value (Dahlander and Gann, 2010; Teece, 1986; West, 2006). If 
knowledge can be protected by IPR, organizations also may transfer IPR to other 
organizations (e.g., licensing) or negotiate shared rights in a joint venture (Grandori and Soda, 
1995). 
 Finally, the characteristics of organizational actors pertain to their ability and willingness 
to engage in knowledge transfer (Martin and Salomon, 2003; Mowery et al., 2002). With 
regard to the ability to learn from others, many studies establish the importance of absorptive 
capacity for effective knowledge transfer (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Mowery et al., 1996). 
With our focus on how and when organizations decide to engage in interorganizational 
knowledge transfer, we also address the willingness to engage in knowledge transfer, which 
involves the willingness to learn – the determination to acquire knowledge (Hamel, 1991; 
Simonin, 2004) – and the willingness to transfer to others (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). 
Willingness to learn from others depends on the perceived knowledge characteristics of the 
source, including the strategic importance of that knowledge (Pérez-Nordtvedt et al., 2008; 
6 
 
Tsang, 2002). Willingness to transfer to others might be hampered by fear of inadvertent 
knowledge losses (Cassiman et al., 2009; Dahlander and Gann, 2010) or free-riding by others 
(Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000), leading managers to protect their organization’s knowledge base 
(Henkel, 2006; Khanna et al., 1998; Norman, 2004). The willingness to transfer knowledge to 
others thus tends to be higher in relations characterized by trust and commitment (Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005).  
 Although prior research clearly offers valuable insights into influences on the amount of 
interorganizational knowledge transfer, we lack sufficient understanding of how and why 
organizations might change their knowledge transfer activities (Dahlander and Gann, 2010; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Phelps et al., 2012). By focusing on existing knowledge alliances 
and their characteristics (e.g., Simonin, 2004; Tsang, 2002), most studies adopt a variance 
approach (Mohr, 1982; Van de Ven, 2007) and explain variance in the amount of knowledge 
transfer by variance in its antecedents. These antecedents are modeled as both necessary and 
sufficient causes, such that a change in the antecedent seemingly always prompts a change in 
the outcome (Mohr, 1982). Yet relational contexts and knowledge bases rarely can change 
quickly; it takes time to build relationships, accumulate tacit knowledge, and establish formal 
appropriability. These rather stable characteristics are unlikely to form the necessary and 
sufficient causes of more discontinuous changes in an organization’s engagement in 
interorganizational knowledge transfer, because changes in the outcome are not always 
preceded by changes in the antecedents.  
 Also an actor’s willingness to engage in knowledge transfer – associated with the actual 
decision to engage in knowledge transfer – thus far has been treated as a given antecedent 
(Simonin, 2004; Tsang, 2002) or explained by the relational context (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005) 
and knowledge characteristics (Pérez-Nordtvedt et al., 2008). Thus, willingness to engage 
cannot suffice to explain changes in knowledge transfer either. It is both theoretically and 
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practically relevant to understand better why and when organizations engage in or actively 
block knowledge transfers, as well as the changes in these decisions over time.  
 In our quest to clarify the dynamics of knowledge transfer, it emerged from initial 
analysis that these changes relate to the framing of future developments of the innovation. The 
concept of framing is rooted in strategy and organizational literature that investigates how 
organizational actors process information and how the resulting interpretations mediate their 
actions (Daft and Weick, 1984; Kaplan, 2011; Walsh, 1995). Cognitive processes become 
particularly important when information is ambiguous or absent, such as in technological 
innovation processes with uncertain outcomes (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). The complexity 
and ambiguity of technical information challenges actors to develop cognitive structures 
(including frames) that transform a complex information environment into a tractable one 
(Walsh, 1995). These cognitive structures then allocate the actors’ attention, guide their 
evaluations of ambiguous information, and provide a basis for inference. We attend to framing 
to address our research question regarding how and why organizational actors’ decisions about 
interorganizational knowledge transfer change over time. 
METHODS 
We conducted a longitudinal study with qualitative procedures to develop theory about the 
dynamics of interorganizational knowledge transfer (Locke, 2001; Vaughan, 1992). 
Specifically, we sought to develop a theoretical explanation of decision making on 
interorganizational knowledge transfer activities. Because we aim to explain changes, we took 
a process approach focusing on how change is brought about by actors that are enabled and 
constrained by evolving structures (see Giddens, 1984). Therefore, we needed detailed data 
about motives and actions over time, as can best be collected from qualitative data sources 
such as interviews (Langley, 1999). Because a core objective was to explore and theorize 
about knowledge transfer dynamics, we also needed an open inquiry approach, which is 
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enabled by qualitative methods (Strauss, 1987). Finally, with this qualitative research 
approach, we could tap multiple, complementary data sources and generate a comprehensive 
analysis of the knowledge transfer interactions (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  
 For our study context, we chose a network of organizations involved in the development of 
fiber metal laminates (FML), a material initially explored by the Dutch aircraft manufacturer 
Fokker in cooperation with Delft University of Technology (TU Delft) and the Dutch 
aerospace laboratory NLR. Fiber metal laminates are sheet materials, composed of thin layers 
of metal (here, aluminum) and fiber adhesives, which have been developed to reduce metal 
fatigue problems in aircraft. Researchers from TU Delft engaged with the Dutch chemical 
company Akzo for the supply of aramid fibers, 3M for the adhesive, and Alcoa for aluminum 
sheets. Over the years, other parties joined and withdrew, such as Bombardier, Boeing, 
McDonnell Douglas, and Saab (see Berends et al., 2011). Others became increasingly 
involved over time, such as Airbus and Stork Fokker; two firms that collaborated closely to 
develop the FML application “Glare” for the fuselage of the Airbus A380. This marked a 
significant innovation, as the introduction of new classes of materials in primary aircraft 
structures is rare (Vlot, 2001). 
 This setting is well suited to investigate interorganizational knowledge transfer dynamics. 
First, the interactions extended over three decades, of which we studied a period of more than 
20 years related to the development of Glare (1987–2010). Second, extensive documentation 
was available, including historical accounts, patents, publications, and public sources, 
allowing us to triangulate our primary, interview-based data (Jick, 1979). Thus, in this setting, 
the phenomena of interest were present to a high degree, well documented, and extended over 
time (Pettigrew, 1990). 
Data Collection 
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Data collection started with interviews of people who had central roles in the development of 
FML. A first contact at Stork Fokker (which produced Glare for the Airbus A380) provided 
initial information that helped us identify key informants, complemented by the documented 
history of Glare (Vlot, 2001). Subsequently, we used snowball sampling to identify other key 
informants, such that we asked interviewees to identify relevant informants and followed up 
with people mentioned in narratives, interviews, or documents. We also deliberately searched 
for organizations and informants that were no longer active, for instance due to individual 
retirement, organizational withdrawal, career moves, or conflicts. With these insights, we 
gathered accounts of less fruitful episodes and closed collaborations, which reduced the threat 
of self-promotion or overemphasis on past successes (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  
 The interviews took place over a five-year period. The initial round of 18 interviews 
occurred in 2005 and 2006 and resulted in the initial case history and analysis. Then between 
2007 and 2010, we conducted 24 additional and follow-up interviews and engaged in multiple 
e-mail conversations pertaining to specific questions. Ultimately, we conducted 42 in-depth 
interviews with 30 actors who participated centrally in the development of FML. Many served 
in different organizations over time, so we had multiple interviewees per organization. The 
interviews were recorded and transcribed, and most of them were conducted by at least two 
researchers. These waves of interviews enabled us to follow developments in real time for five 
years of the innovation trajectory. We reconstructed developments before 2005 retrospectively 
by seeking data about each significant event from at least three respondents, who represented 
at least two organizations (see Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Thus we could tap potential 
differences in perspectives and emotional involvement (Golden, 1992; Huber and Power, 
1985). 
 The interview protocol started with questions about the interviewee’s career history, 
involvement with FML, and the involvement of the organization. Then we focused on specific 
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knowledge transfer interactions and asked about the initiation, change in, and possible 
termination of all interorganizational knowledge transfer interactions; the motives for 
particular actions; and how interviewees framed the future of FML at certain points in time. 
Follow-up interviews focused on the process as it had evolved since the initial interview and 
any changes in the framing. Subsequent interviews also offered information about issues that 
might have been confidential during the initial interviews.  
 We triangulated these interview data with other sources (Jick, 1979). First, we consulted a 
technical text about FML and narratives of its history, such as those by Vlot (2001), Vlot and 
Gunnink (2001), Vermeeren (2003), Vogelesang (2003), and Alderliesten (2009). Second, we 
collected archival documentation, such as technical publications, patents, theses, conference 
proceedings and participant lists, sales brochures, research program reports and documents, 
press announcements, newspaper articles, and public interviews. Table I summarizes our data 
sources and their uses in our analysis; Table II provides details about each participating 
organization and interviewee.  
----- Insert Tables I and II about here ----- 
Data Analysis 
The first step in our analysis, starting in 2005, was to create a comprehensive narrative of the 
FML history. We coded the interview transcripts for descriptions of actors, decisions and 
actions to generate an overview of chronological events (Langley, 1999), and mapped of the 
evolution of the collaborative network (see Berends et al., 2011). We sent the resulting initial 
narrative to 15 interviewees for feedback. Their comments established the reliability of our 
narrative, in that they suggested only a few minor modifications. The subsequent data 
collection extended this initial interpretation.  
 In the second analytical step, we identified knowledge transfer interactions. Specifically, 
we collected interview segments and other data sources that indicated that the involved 
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organizations shared knowledge, bought or sold knowledge, invited other parties to share 
knowledge, stopped knowledge sharing or transfer interactions with other parties, or shielded 
and protected knowledge for others. These knowledge transfer interactions provide the units of 
analysis, embedded in the case of FML development.  
 Finally, we developed explanations for the observed interorganizational knowledge 
transfer dynamics. During multiple sessions we jointly interpreted and coded data to create 
shared understanding of ambiguous information, and we established a coding scheme, based 
initially on open coding of the data. We compared and analyzed knowledge transfer 
interactions with regard to the related knowledge transfer decisions and characteristics of the 
organizational actors, their relations, and their knowledge. By going back and forth between 
the raw data and existing theoretical concepts, such as from the literature on cognitive framing 
(e.g., Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Kaplan, 2011), we refined and reworded the observations and 
developed theoretical observations or second-order themes (Gioia et al., 2013). Organizing 
these theoretical observations into theoretical categories suggested explanations of changes in 
knowledge transfer interactions over time. Figure I depicts the data structure.  
----- Insert Figure I ----- 
 All analytical steps were executed iteratively during the entire data collection period, from 
2005 to 2011, and jointly by all three authors, which produced a rich understanding of the 
FML history. Realizing that all interpretations are fallible and influenced by theoretical 
preconceptions, we discussed all differences of opinion and, if necessary, solicited input from 
interviewees until we reached consensus. Discussions throughout the data collection and 
analysis inhibited any tendencies to overidentify with particular interpretations and helped to 
reach intersubjective agreement.  
FINDINGS 
Key Elements of Interorganizational Knowledge Transfer Dynamics  
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In our study context, organizations repeatedly changed their knowledge transfer interactions 
with other organizations. The network of collaborating partners grew and shrunk over time, 
and knowledge transfer linkages repeatedly spanned continents, only to be severed again later. 
To explain interorganizational knowledge transfer dynamics, we rely on five theoretical 
categories: deciding about engagement in interorganizational knowledge transfer, (re)framing 
innovation, events triggering (re)framing, the developing knowledge base, and the evolving 
relational context (see Figure I).  
Deciding about engagement in interorganizational knowledge transfer  
Literature on open innovation suggests a distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
knowledge exchanges (Dahlander and Gann, 2010), but most empirical studies investigate 
only one form, such as pecuniary knowledge exchange in the form of licensing. We coded 
knowledge transfer decisions as two distinct but not exclusive categories: knowledge sharing 
and knowledge trading. Whereas knowledge sharing involves no direct monetary 
compensation, knowledge trading requires a market transaction. Both categories consisted of 
decisions to initiate or intensify sharing or trading, as well as to reduce or terminate it. As an 
example of knowledge sharing, Structural Laminates Company (SLC, a joint venture of Alcoa 
and Akzo) intensified this by deciding to send an engineer to Boeing to work on particular 
FML applications and share tacit design knowledge: “I visited Boeing quite frequently, and I 
started by being located for several months at Boeing” (SLC engineer, 25O). With regard to 
knowledge trading, we observed both the sale and the acquisition of knowledge. For example, 
when Alcoa backed out of the joint venture in 1997, Akzo’s strategic advisor decided to 
request a license for applications of FML in Europe:  
Krook [advisor of Akzo] said: but Airbus is interested in Glare. And he [the Alcoa 
representative] said: then Airbus can get a license. Krook said: then, Akzo can get a license as 
well. That’s how the license passed into Dutch hands again. (SLC manager 8T) 
 
(Re)framing innovation 
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Framing the innovation development as an opportunity or threat influences the decision to 
initiate, intensify, reduce or terminate knowledge transfer activities toward a certain partner. 
Opportunity and threat categories are frames that decision makers use frequently to interpret 
strategic issues. Issues framed as opportunities appear beneficial and under the organization’s 
control, whereas those framed as threats appear detrimental and beyond control (Dutton and 
Jackson, 1987; Kennedy and Fiss, 2009). Framing the innovation’s future concerns both the 
creation and the appropriation of value, namely, as an opportunity for the organization to 
create and appropriate value or the threat that others might create or capture value. For 
example, Akzo and 3M managers framed the development of the first FML variant Arall (a 
predecessor of Glare) as an opportunity to create and appropriate commercial value: Akzo 
managers wanted new applications for Akzo’s fibers, and 3M managers expected to sell large 
volumes of adhesives for new generations of aircraft (to “cover aircraft surfaces with multiple 
layers of adhesives” as a 3M sales representative [20M] phrased it). A TU Delft professor and 
his academic colleagues also framed this development as an opportunity to appropriate value 
in terms of reputation, funding, and educational activities:  
Maybe, I could have gained three million dollar, but I didn’t like that at all. I wanted a good 
cooperation with the industry, enabling my students to develop the material. (Vogelesang, in 
the Dutch newspaper de Volkskrant, 2002) 
 
Yet even when actors frame innovation developments as opportunities, they might 
simultaneously perceive threats that other actors will appropriate the resulting value. As an 
Airbus engineer explained:  
Look, the only thing that Airbus fears is their competitor, which is Boeing. Besides that, there 
is no competitor for Airbus. Which implies that they did not want Boeing to acquire their 
knowledge at the short term. (Airbus engineer 11A)  
 
Opportunity and threat frames thus may coexist, though one usually dominates. We therefore 
distinguish three core frames for the future of the innovation process: framing as opportunity, 
framing as threat, and unframing as opportunity, such that the opportunity appears to shrink or 
vanish completely. We did not find any knowledge transfer decisions that suggested threat 
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unframing, perhaps because unframing a threat does not result in an observable change in 
decisions about knowledge transfer interactions.  
 Unframing an opportunity relates to an actor’s time horizon. For example, researchers 
from TU Delft, Alcoa, and Akzo imagined applying FML to commercial aircraft within about 
five years. The aircraft development programs that could incorporate FML offered rare 
windows of opportunity, so any cancellation or postponement of a program implied that the 
opportunity was suddenly distant or, for some parties, beyond their time horizon (see Das, 
2004). In the 1990s for example, the opportunity to apply Glare to Boeing aircraft and the 
Saab 2000 disappeared, and the Fokker 130 program was cancelled. In such situations, 
industrial parties (i.e., 3M) backed out, because the opportunities to capture value moved 
beyond their time horizon. 
Event triggering (re)framing  
(Re)framing is triggered by three types of events, which can co-occur. First, company-internal 
factors, such as changes in company strategy, can lead to (re)framing. These company-internal 
factors have direct influences on the type of reframing, because the people who change the 
internal strategy have their own strategic agendas, with consequences for framing the 
innovation as an opportunity, threat, or unframing. In 1998, at Akzo, one of the early FML 
partners, managers decided to focus on paint and coatings and sell the fiber division. Thus, 
they lost their product/technology fit with FML, which led them to reframe FML 
development.  
 Second, external factors, such as changes in the wider market and industry environment, 
trigger (re)framing. The sources of these changes do not necessarily concur with the 
preferences of the decision makers so the type of (re)framing is typically not determined by 
the change itself but rather by the responses to it. At Alcoa, changes in the market and industry 
triggered multiple (re)framings, in terms of both opportunities and threats. When composites 
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were introduced as an aircraft material, Alcoa managers framed FML as an aluminum-based 
material that still could compete with composites. But when aircraft manufacturers faced 
problems with applying composites, increasing the likelihood of a stable aluminum market, 
this triggered Alcoa managers to frame FML development as a threat to Alcoa’s still 
successful full-aluminum products.  
 Third, the endogenous results of the knowledge transfer process itself, such as 
technological breakthroughs, trigger (re)framing. These triggers reflect the ongoing 
collaborative development, so they are path dependent. When joint research between TU Delft 
with the U.S. Air Force showed that Glare had promising properties as a repair patch installed 
over cracks in fuselages or wings of existing aircraft, TU Delft researchers began to frame the 
innovation as an opportunity to repair existing Hercules 130 or C-5 Galaxy aircraft. All three 
triggers help to understand why and when an actor’s framing of the future, and thus its 
decision about involvement in transferring knowledge about FML, might change. These 
triggers not only prompt (re)framing the innovation development but also influence the type of 
reframing in terms of opportunities and threats. 
The developing knowledge base 
Characteristics of the developing knowledge base, such as formal appropriability and the 
accumulated stock of tacit knowledge, are incorporated in (re)framing and were leveraged in 
decisions about engaging in interorganizational knowledge transfer. A Bombardier manager 
incorporated Bombardier’s accumulated stock of tacit knowledge in framing FML 
development as an opportunity for a new aircraft. Bombardier had all the required production 
equipment and the expertise to absorb FML knowledge, so it could produce FML for its own 
aircraft, which also provided an interesting knowledge exploitation opportunity: 
We do have those facilities both in terms of pretreatment and autoclaves …, that’s part of the 
reason that we were interested in Glare, because it was based on metal bonding technology.… 
We’ve had a major investment in facilities. (Bombardier engineer 16B) 
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 Actors also leveraged their evolving knowledge base for decisions about engaging in 
interorganizational knowledge transfer. When the appropriability of their knowledge was 
protected by IPR, organizations could share and trade knowledge while protecting the value 
created. Thus Akzo managers used their IPR over FML to share knowledge with other 
commercial parties, such as Alcoa and 3M, without worrying that Alcoa or 3M might 
appropriate too much value. In contrast, a lack of IPR constrained actors, making them 
hesitant to share their knowledge. They might instead opt for secrecy and avoid sharing 
knowledge, even in close collaborations. Noting the IPR struggles between Akzo and Alcoa, 
an Alcoa representative pointed out that without some form of appropriability, Alcoa would 
never engage in knowledge transfer: 
Alcoa did not want to pursue a concept or a business possibility without having control of the 
technology. (SLC manager 6L) 
 
The evolving relational context 
The focal knowledge transfer activities occur in networked, collaborative, ongoing innovation 
processes, in which multiple actors worked to develop and apply a new aircraft material. This 
evolving relational context, consisting of prior relationships and contractual governance 
mechanisms, was incorporated in (re)framing the innovation development. Specifically, actors 
developed frames that reflected how their prior ties and contractual governance mechanisms 
might apply in future collaborations. For example, in the cooperation between Airbus and 
Stork Fokker to apply Glare to the A380, FMLC, as a “center of excellence”, served to 
develop and spread Glare knowledge. But FMLC employees were constrained by their strong 
ties and contracts with Airbus and Stork Fokker, which feared that knowledge could leak 
“across the ocean” to Boeing (Vlot, 2001: 130). In an unforeseen and unintended reaction, 
individual FMLC researchers reframed the future and decided to counter the imposed 
constraints by starting a new company called GTM.  
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 The relational context was also leveraged in decisions to engage in knowledge transfer. 
Prior relationships enabled actors to establish connections or reinvigorate dormant ties (see 
Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) but also prevented others from sharing or trading knowledge. In 
1987, Alcoa managers used their strong ties with McDonnell Douglas and other aircraft 
manufacturers to exchange knowledge about its FML product and thus develop applications 
for new aircraft: 
[Alcoa’s FML director] had access to key people within the company and was very motivated. 
It was very unusual.… There is no doubt that MDC and Alcoa had a close relationship and that 
was reflected by the fact that we allowed these people to come into our company, basically 
from Alcoa. I never heard of anything like that happening for any other product. (MDC 
engineer 15D) 
 
Moreover, contractual governance mechanisms enabled actors to force network partners to 
halt their knowledge sharing activities with others, such as potential competitors. Stork 
Fokker’s role as one of the founding parties enabled it to restrict FMLC from sharing FML 
knowledge with others:  
FMLC intended to be an institute ... to market [FML] knowledge to Boeing and Bombardier 
and to reach out to others.… But [the knowledge] was always kept under a lid.… Sharing 
knowledge beyond the cooperation between Stork Fokker and Airbus was not possible. (NIVR 
manager 5N)  
 
A Model of Knowledge Transfer Dynamics  
In Figure II we reveal how the five elements together explain how and why decisions about 
interorganizational knowledge transfer change over time. The process model centers on the 
variable nature of cognitive framing as a primary source of changes in organizations’ 
decisions to engage in interorganizational knowledge transfer activities. Framing and 
reframing of innovation developments are triggered by internal, external, and endogenous 
factors. The actor’s (re)framing incorporates the developing knowledge base and evolving 
relational context, which subsequently get leveraged in the actor’s decision to engage in 
interorganizational knowledge transfer activities. Eventually, knowledge transfer interactions 
also shape the knowledge base and the relational context – though these change at a relatively 
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slow pace – when new knowledge gets accumulated and new relationships form. Because 
actors incorporate in their framing the existing relational context and knowledge base, the 
actor’s framing is partly path dependent but not determined by knowledge or relationships. 
Only by including the effect of shifting frames can we understand how and why organizational 
actors decide to engage in or withdraw from knowledge transfer interactions.  
---- Insert Figure II about here ---- 
 When they frame the innovation development as an opportunity, organizational actors 
tend to initiate or intensify knowledge transfer activities. They leverage the evolving relational 
context to establish connections for knowledge sharing and joint knowledge development. 
Formal appropriability mechanisms lessen the hesitation to open up knowledge transfer 
activities with competitors. Further, the knowledge base influences whether an innovation gets 
framed as an opportunity (e.g., Bombardier’s knowledge base suited FML production). 
 A threat frame instead dominates when opportunities for value appropriation appear to be 
moving closer in time, because actors imagine that others might capture the value from the 
innovation. When a threat frame becomes dominant, the general tendency is to protect any 
chances to appropriate value. Actors engage selectively in knowledge sharing interactions and 
close other knowledge flows; sometimes they even attempt to close knowledge flows between 
other actors in the network, particularly with (potential) competitors. In our observations, 
actors usually attempt to close their cooperation with direct competitors and enforce 
exclusivity in knowledge sharing with suppliers or customers, if they can. For an innovation 
framed as a threat, powerful actors leverage their relational context, and especially the 
presence of contractual governance mechanisms, to force others to halt knowledge sharing. 
The existing knowledge base – particularly accumulated tacit knowledge – thus invigorates 
the threat frame and enables actors to decide whether to protect knowledge, because 
transferring tacit knowledge requires dedicated investments. 
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 Finally, when actors unframe the innovation development as an opportunity, they 
unilaterally reduce or terminate knowledge sharing and shift to knowledge trading. They 
leverage their relational characteristics to transfer or sell remaining activities or knowledge 
resources to others. Moreover, if they own IPR, actors leverage this resource to sell knowledge 
rights to others, through which they could appropriate at least some value from their past 
investments in innovation development and knowledge sharing.  
 To illustrate how this model explains the dynamics of interorganizational knowledge 
transfer over time, we narrate the changing involvement of three organizations. Overviews of 
the interactions we analyze for each organization appear in Tables III–V; a comprehensive 
view of the interactions all analyzed organizations is available on request. 
----- Insert Table III, IV and V about here ----- 
Alcoa 
Initially, researchers and managers at aluminum producer Alcoa framed the emerging FML 
technology as an aluminum-based answer to the development of black composites for aircraft 
structures, in particular for wings, and they invested in acquiring an exclusive license from 
Akzo and developing the technology. In 1987, when FML technology was ready for 
production, Alcoa managers opened a plant in Pittsburg (PA) to produce Arall and used their 
strong ties in the aircraft industry to share knowledge with aircraft manufacturers such as 
Boeing, Aérospatiale, and Lockheed to increase market interest in material (Table III, 
interaction 1). As a result, Alcoa entered into a contract with McDonnell Douglas to develop 
an Arall application for the cargo door of the C-17 military aircraft.  
 Unfortunately, TU Delft researchers found some detrimental properties of Arall. After 
innovating the glassfiber–based alternative Glare, they convinced Akzo’s R&D managers to 
invest in Glare research, transferred the IPR to Akzo, and started to market Glare. Thus, the 
interorganizational knowledge transfer process resulted in a new material, but at Alcoa, this 
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new innovation was framed as a threat to value appropriation from past investments in Arall. 
Furthermore, Alcoa did not have IPR over Glare. As an Akzo product developer stated:  
Alcoa set its heart on Arall, and they were not at all convinced about the superiority of the 
Glare product. Moreover, I think that Alcoa already put a lot of money into Arall, and they did 
not want to exchange Arall for Glare. (Akzo product developer 28Z) 
 
Alcoa managers decided to resist knowledge sharing for Glare and pushed for knowledge 
sharing about Arall instead, using their strong ties in the industry (Table III, interaction 2).  
 In 1990, Boeing management selected Glare for the cargo floor of its 737. This event 
finally prompted Alcoa’s managers to go along with Akzo and Glare and enter into a joint 
venture, Structural Laminates Company (SLC), which owned all IPR and coordinated 
technology development. Somewhat later, a change of leadership in the aerospace division 
(the new vice president came from Alcoa’s core “sheet and plate” aluminum division) 
triggered another reframing of FML innovations as a cannibalizer in the fuselages market. 
Glare, unlike Arall, was particularly well suited for fuselages, such that FML got framed as a 
competitor to Alcoa’s aluminum alloys: 
Our people were working on fuselages. For fuselages, Alcoa had a new [aluminum] material 
and fuselages are their core business. That generated a lot of money for them. And we were 
marketing fuselage material, which created a conflict with Alcoa. This finally resulted in: we 
will cut down SLC to a technology house, just to maintain the patent. (SLC manager 8T) 
 
The new vice president demanded that SLC refrained from marketing fuselage applications, 
but this strategic shift never happened, with important consequences for interorganizational 
knowledge sharing (Table III, interaction 3). Alcoa managers leveraged their strong ties and 
existing contracts with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas to reduce collaboration on Glare. An 
SLC representative recalled:  
The more successful we were with Boeing, the more of a concern this became for the Alcoa 
group. It got to the point where ... the Alcoa sheet and plate sales people continued to interfere 
with our development efforts within OEMs like Boeing and Airbus. To the point where – with 
Boeing – we believed that they were actually giving bad information [to Boeing]. (SLC 
manager 6L) 
 
In 1993, Boeing management finally called for a moratorium on Glare studies. Meanwhile, 
Alcoa still controlled the IPR for FML, through its majority share in SLC.  
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 In 1997, external changes – Fokker filed for bankruptcy, and Saab and McDonnell 
Douglas lost their interest in FML – triggered Alcoa to unframe FML development as an 
opportunity and entirely halt its knowledge sharing (Table III, interaction 4). Considering its 
knowledge base, especially the existence of formal appropriability and IPR, Alcoa’s reduced 
collaboration had a huge impact on knowledge transfer activities related to Glare and 
prevented others from appropriating the patented technology.  
We maintained the licensing and the patents and those kinds of things. There was interest in 
doing that: maintaining the technology. But we took a wait-and-see attitude. (Alcoa engineer 
3L) 
 
Nevertheless, Alcoa still leveraged the formal appropriability of its knowledge base and 
sought revenues from selling licenses for European applications to Akzo and for secondary 
structures (not fuselage skin or wings) to other companies. 
 Around 2005, the framing shifted to view FML development as an opportunity again. 
Triggered by external changes in the market and the technology, including the major FML 
application on the Airbus A380 and Boeing’s full-composite 787, Alcoa’s management 
revived framing FML as an opportunity to counter composites (Table III, interaction 5): 
There is a program within Alcoa that is funded towards fiber metal laminates. It has basically 
come full circle. It’s back to where it was in 1982. (Aviation Equipment representative 6L) 
 
Alcoa started a collaboration with GTM, a company consisting of former SLC, FMLC, and 
TU Delft researchers. The opportunity frame also was enabled by the informal ties that Alcoa 
employees maintained with the researchers and the IPR that Alcoa still owned; both the 
relational context and the knowledge base could be leveraged in the decision to reengage. 
Through combined efforts by GTM and Alcoa, erstwhile partners returned to cocreating FML, 
including Bombardier, the U.S. Air Force, and Boeing. GTM and Alcoa engineers jointly 
developed multiple FML variants, which triggered Alcoa managers to frame a threat of 
competitors appropriating some created value (Table III, interaction 6). Therefore they 
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reduced and restricted knowledge sharing, protecting their knowledge with five patents in 
2005 and 2006, as enabled by contractual agreements between Alcoa and GTM.  
 Three years later, Alcoa’s product managers once more reframed FML in general as a 
threat to their aluminum business and halted their collaboration yet again (Table III, 
interaction 7). This reframing was triggered by internal strategy changes and problems that 
Alcoa’s clients encountered in developing aircraft with materials other than aluminum (FML 
and composites). Alcoa’s management decided to stop the joint knowledge sharing program, 
but because they still framed FML as a dormant threat to their aluminum products, they 
retained the patents and granted no licenses for Glare applications on primary aircraft 
structures in the United States: 
Alcoa still has total control of the patents. There is one person within Alcoa that basically has 
that responsibility. He is the vice president of aerospace sheet and plate products. The licenses 
here in the US [for secondary applications] were sold to … Aviation Equipment. (Aviation 
Equipment representative 6L)  
 
----- Insert Table IV about here ----- 
Bombardier 
Our model also explains changes in the involvement of more peripheral players, such as 
Bombardier. At the first FML conference in 1987, de Havilland, one of the companies that 
would later make up Bombardier, participated, though this involvement remained informal, 
because there was no new aircraft program available for FML applications. But by 1996, the 
development of the new Learjet 45 triggered Bombardier engineers to frame FML 
development as an opportunity for a specific part of the aircraft, incorporating existing 
relationships with the FML community and their knowledge about metal bonding (Table IV, 
interaction 1). They started sharing and codeveloping knowledge about this particular 
application, in which setting they leveraged their existing ties as well as their knowledge base.  
 After the application of FML on the Airbus A380, Bombardier began developing a new 
aircraft, the C-series. Triggered by their good experiences with Glare, Bombardier engineers 
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framed the innovation as a new opportunity, incorporating in their framing their existing 
knowledge base and production capacity (see our previous discussion), and existing relations 
within the FML community (Table IV, interaction 2). Therefore, Bombardier managers started 
negotiating with Stork Fokker about knowledge sharing and a license to produce and apply 
Glare. Yet Bombardier’s engagement interacted with Stork Fokker’s threat framing, which 
motivated it to block knowledge transfer with Bombardier. As a manager from Stork Fokker 
reported:  
There certainly was demand [from Bombardier], but first of all, the exclusivity agreement with 
Airbus held us back, and second, some of those who asked [for Glare] laid down conditions we 
simply could not agree to. Our idea was not that we would tell them how to produce Glare and 
then never hear from them again. (Stork Fokker manager 2F) 
 
Stork Fokker’s management remained unwilling to sell Bombardier production rights: 
One of the benefits to be accrued from Glare is the splicing technology. And if you begin to do 
that you begin to infringe people’s patents and so on. And it was difficult to see through all of 
that. So the fact that we could just use the material [and not produce it], and [our] people and 
facilities were redundant, meant that we decided to change to aluminum. (Bombardier engineer 
16B) 
 
As a result, the cooperation between Bombardier and Stork Fokker broke down. This 
illustrates how the different frames of (potential) collaborators resulted in changes in 
interorganizational collaboration and knowledge transfers over time.  
----- Insert Table V about here ----- 
Airbus 
In 1988, researchers at MBB (which later became part of Airbus, together with Aérospatiale) 
learned about FML, which triggered an opportunity frame for a new generation of aircraft 
(Table V, interaction 1). Their existing knowledge base enabled them to grasp the essence of 
the material, and they contacted TU Delft researchers. Intensive cooperation during the test 
program established a basis for continued knowledge sharing, which also was facilitated by 
strong personal ties between MBB and TU Delft engineers. Persistent knowledge sharing in 
SLC also helped convince some of the involved parties to continue to frame Glare as an 
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opportunity. German and French Airbus partners became increasingly involved in jointly 
designing and testing Glare for new aircraft.  
 Building on their existing contacts at Aérospatiale, SLC engineers initiated a joint 
research program with multiple partners from the aircraft industry by sending SLC engineers 
to Aérospatiale in Toulouse. Aérospatiale’s managers agreed but also framed the innovation 
development as a threat, because it included competitors that could appropriate value (Table 
V, interaction 2). Therefore, they leveraged their relation with SLC and TU Delft to enforce 
restricted knowledge sharing:  
We got much information from Aérospatiale ... and we would distribute the knowledge among 
customers.... But Aérospatiale was afraid of distributing knowledge.… We signed a 
nondisclosure with Aérospatiale, stating that we would do nothing with that information. (SLC 
engineer 27S) 
 
When the results of the tests showed promising results, Airbus began to frame FML as an 
opportunity to solve some of the challenges that its proposed superjumbo faced (Table V, 
interaction 3). As an Airbus vice president noted,  
If we apply Glare on the A3XX, this will give a 15 to 20 ton weight reduction. (Dutch 
newspaper NRC Handelsblad, 1998)  
 
 Therefore, knowledge sharing intensified, and Akzo, TU Delft, and Stork Fokker 
employees were invited to work closely with the Large Aircraft Division of Airbus, enabled 
by their strong ties. Airbus’s engineers and managers became more interested in applying 
Glare to the A380 superjumbo, but Alcoa was no longer backing the development of FML. 
Alcoa’s management thus broke up the joint venture; Akzo negotiated a license for European 
FML applications. Therefore, Airbus managers could frame FML applications as an 
opportunity to create and appropriate value, because they could use this exclusive license. At 
the same time, the development of a production-ready FML was framed as a threat, due to the 
fear that competitors (i.e., Boeing) might walk away with the results (Table V, interaction 4): 
Airbus feared any flow of knowledge across the ocean.… The technology for Glare 
applications had to be guarded.… Airbus’ nightmare scenario was that its precious new 
knowledge would fall into the hands of Boeing. (Vlot, 2001: 131) 
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By leveraging its strong ties and formal contracts with the involved parties, Airbus limited the 
sharing of knowledge with these parties – and limited it even more with others. When Airbus 
and Stork Fokker managers later signed an agreement to produce and apply Glare on the 
A380, this threat frame reappeared (Table V, interaction 5), such that Airbus managers even 
demanded exclusivity from parties related to Stork Fokker. That is, the contractual agreement 
with Stork Fokker was leveraged to block knowledge sharing, using Stork Fokker’s role in 
FMLC. 
DISCUSSION  
We have addressed how and why organizational actors’ decisions about interorganizational 
knowledge transfer change over time. We analyzed data related to more than two decades of 
technology development to identify how and why organizational actors change their 
engagement in interorganizational knowledge transfer in a network of organizations. From this 
analysis, we derived a cognitive framing model which offers an integrated explanation of the 
decisions to engage or disengage in knowledge transfer activities.  
 First, our cognitive framing perspective explains discontinuous changes in collaborative 
knowledge transfer activities, highlighting the role of the future in explaining such dynamics. 
While we know that organizational actors usually enter into knowledge transfer interactions 
for strategic reasons (Meier, 2011), which are typically future oriented (Das, 2004), most 
research has taken the actor’s willingness to engage in knowledge transfer for granted and 
centers on antecedents that characterize the situation as it currently stands (e.g., relational 
context, knowledge base). The focus on antecedents of the current situation could explain 
continuous change (i.e., changes in knowledge transfer are explained by changes in these 
existing antecedents) but not discontinuous change. Less attention focuses on the actor’s 
future-oriented agency (Phelps et al., 2012), except for the “shadow of the future,” that is, the 
potential for future retaliation in response to opportunistic behavior (Heide and Miner, 1992).  
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 Our study shows that discontinuous changes in knowledge transfer can be explained by 
(un)framing the innovation as an opportunity or threat, reflecting dominant frames in 
managerial cognition (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Kennedy and Fiss, 2009). Despite the fact 
that these frames concern innovation developments that are far in the future – and not short-
term expectations about costs and benefits – the framing appears variable, reflecting the 
uncertain fate of collaborative innovation. Though years of investment may be needed to 
create and appropriate expected value, unforeseen events can prompt actors to quite abruptly 
reframe future developments as opportunities or threats. Recall for instance how, triggered by 
internal strategy changes, Alcoa’s management changed all of a sudden its framing of the 
FML technology from an opportunity to a threat framing, resulting in a reduction of 
knowledge transfer activities. This change could not be explained by just considering the 
knowledge base and relational characteristics, as they only gradually evolved, but we can 
understand why Alcoa’s behavior changed by taking into account the framing of the future.  
 Second, our findings suggest a different theoretical role for characteristics of the relational 
context and knowledge base than usually assumed in existing studies. Many studies consider 
the relational context and the knowledge base as necessary and sufficient conditions for 
enhancing knowledge transfer in a given context (see Mohr, 1982). High quality relationships 
and good governance practices enhance knowledge sharing in established collaborations and 
enable engaging in new interorganizational knowledge transfer interactions (e.g., Becerra et 
al., 2008; Bygrave, 2007; Van Wijk et al., 2008). Moreover, a knowledge base consisting of 
established intellectual property rights and tacit knowledge is considered as an important 
condition for knowledge transfer (e.g., Dahlander and Gann, 2010; Grandori and Soda, 1995). 
Yet, our process study suggests that having the right relational context and knowledge base is 
not a necessary and sufficient condition that explains why organizations engage in knowledge 
transfer, but that their roles depend on how organizational actors incorporate them in their 
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framing of the innovation. That is, changes in knowledge transfer cannot be explained by 
changes in characteristics but by how these characteristics get exploited through human 
agency. This exemplifies a dynamic interaction of structure and agency, in which structures 
enable and constrain actors but do not determine their behavior, as also proposed by 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). Organizational actors draw on the relational context and 
their knowledge base, without being determined by them; they exploit them differently in 
response to changes in framing opportunities and threats. Moreover, though difficult and not 
observed in our study, actors might pursue an opportunity even if they cannot leverage the 
right knowledge base and relational context (see Stevenson and Gumpert, 1985). As a result, 
there is not always a straightforward relationship between the firm’s ownership of particular 
resources and the decisions about collaborative innovation (see Toh and Polidoro, in press).  
 Along these lines, we also identify salient differences in how organizational actors draw 
on their relational context and knowledge base. If the future is framed as an opportunity, 
existing relationships can be leveraged to initiate knowledge sharing. However, when future 
developments are framed as threats, existing relationships and contractual governance 
mechanisms can be leveraged to block knowledge sharing by others. This hindrance adds on 
to the constraining, lock-in effect of existing relations (Uzzi, 1997); we show that such lock-in 
effects even can be exploited purposefully by others. With this insight, we can also partially 
explain conflicting research findings regarding the role of strong ties (Phelps et al., 2012), 
which might be instrumental to knowledge sharing or serve as levers to limit a partner’s ability 
to reach out to new and diverse partners. If the innovation development gets unframed as an 
opportunity and knowledge sharing ends, social ties may exist, dormant, to be leveraged later 
for a new opportunity (see Berends et al., 2011; Levin et al., 2011). Similarly, actors 
incorporate the developing knowledge base in framing opportunities according to existing 
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knowledge and property rights. In knowledge transfer decisions, actors leverage this 
knowledge base to either trade knowledge or prevent others from applying that knowledge.  
 Third, our findings also extend cognitive framing theory. Not only have we demonstrated 
the relevance of the threat and opportunity frames in a new context, but we also have 
identified unframing as influential. Most studies assume opportunity framing as a driver of the 
decision to engage in interorganizational collaboration (Mariotti and Delbridge, 2012; Tyler 
and Steensma, 1998) and others have included threat framing as the contrasting dominant 
frame (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Kennedy and Fiss, 2009). Dutton and Jackson (1987) 
argued that information that is congruent with the category used to frame an issue is more 
likely to be attended to and recalled, and ambiguous information is interpreted so as to 
conform to the expectations associated with a category; subsequently, organizational decisions 
are impacted by these categorizations. Unframing, or deframing, has attracted limited attention 
thus far (Dunbar et al., 1996), but our study shows that the disappearance of an opportunity 
frame also motivates organizational actors. Unframing leads to different knowledge transfer 
interactions than do opportunity or threat frames, so it is an important category to consider in 
further cognitive framing research. While framing processes direct the interpretation of new 
information to make it fit within existing expectations, our study shows that unframing is 
associated with a loss of expectations; actors subsequently just want to make the best of what 
they have. When actors unframe an opportunity, they appear to end knowledge sharing and 
shift to knowledge trading if they have IPR, and leverage their relational characteristics to 
transfer or sell remaining activities or knowledge resources.  
This study offers important implications for managers of organizations that participate in 
an alliance or network to develop a technological innovation. For such an innovation to 
succeed, all partners that own crucial knowledge must remain open to knowledge transfer 
(Powell et al., 1996; Van Wijk et al., 2008), unless a replacement provider of similar 
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knowledge can easily be found. We also observe rather sudden discontinuities in actors’ 
openness to knowledge transfer. To make predictions about an actor’s future openness, it is 
necessary to know how that actor frames the future and on which knowledge bases and 
relational contexts the actor draws. Organizations with vested interests in collaborative 
innovation should consider explicitly how they frame the future and how triggering events 
might affect their own framing, as well as that of others in the network – particularly of 
partners that can influence the frames and/or behaviors of other network partners through their 
strong ties. Our advice to managers therefore is to regularly put themselves in the shoes of 
their alliance partners, imagine how they may frame the future, and influence that framing 
when necessary.  
Limitations and Boundary Conditions 
Several limitations of this study require consideration. For only part of the 20-year time span 
could we ask interviewees about their framing of the future; for the first 15 years, we had to 
rely on the interviewees’ retrospective reconstruction of events and the frames they used at 
that time. Although this restriction may limit the accuracy and completeness of our interview 
data, we also were able to use published accounts of events and expectations, written at 
various times prior to 2005. Our rich, varied data sources enabled us to triangulate across 
multiple fallible perspectives. With this research design, we also identified important long-
term dynamics, which would be hard to observe in a real-time study of limited duration.  
Because we studied the innovation process related to one specific class of materials, a key 
question is whether our findings are idiosyncratic to FML or the aircraft sector, or if our 
insights from this case might explain knowledge transfers in other contexts too. In this sense, 
we consider some boundary conditions on the applicability of our findings. First, these 
findings emerge in an innovation context, which implies uncertain future developments and 
thus invokes framing of the future. The opportunity and threat frames we found even related 
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directly to innovation developments. Innovation processes are marked by a distant, variable 
time horizon, during which time an innovation process can get delayed, or firm and industry 
changes might trigger the unframing of the development as an opportunity. In other contexts, 
opportunity and threat frames may be less dominant in expectations of the future than, for 
example, change versus stability frames (see Sonenshein, 2010). Second, the organizations 
involved in FML development were part of a single industry, which is relatively common for 
collaborative innovation. Thus the involved organizations mostly had some background in 
aeronautical engineering, which formed absorptive capacity and actors incorporated this in 
framing potential competitive threats. If the actors represent different industrial contexts, the 
threat frame may be less relevant. These reflections go beyond our immediate evidence, which 
suggests the need to substantiate them in further research.  
Conclusion 
Our model offers provisional descriptions and accounts of phenomena that are open to 
revision and reformulation, but our analysis suggests that framing the future of a collaborative 
innovation process can effectively explain an organization’s engagement in interorganizational 
knowledge transfer activities. That is, actors’ framing of the future motivates how they 
leverage their relational context and knowledge base. Unlike the rather stable relational 
context or knowledge base, framing is variable and thus serves to explain discontinuities or 
unexpected changes in knowledge transfer interactions. If managers want to anticipate the 
actions and reactions of their collaborations, they should determine how those partners frame 
the collaborative innovation processes in terms of opportunities and/or threats.  
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TABLE I 
Data Sources 
Source of Data Type of Data Use in the Analysis 
   
Interviews 42 interviews executed with people who participated in the development of 
FML, including inventors, people from all involved organizations, and 
people only peripherally or no longer involved. 
Gather data regarding the development of the knowledge 
transfer interactions, the actors’ cognitive framing of the 
innovation, and the relational context and knowledge base.  
 First round: 18 interviews, executed between September 2005 and May 
2006, with 17 individuals (one interviewed twice). Recorded and 
transcribed, for a total of 297 pages.  
Construct an initial case history of knowledge transfer events to 
identify patterns in those events. 
 Second round: 23 interviews, executed between April 2007 and August 2008 
with 13 new informants and 10 follow-up interviews. One key informant 
was interviewed again in 2010. Recorded and transcribed, for a total of 
229 pages. 
Trace developments in real time and verify details of the 
emerging analysis. 
History Narratives Books (3), articles, and reports (8) narrating the development of FML. Construct an initial case history; gather information on events, 
relational and knowledge characteristics; provide clues of 
cognitive framing; give detailed documentation of the early 
years (e.g., Vlot, 2001).  
Press Articles Newspaper and industry journal articles from international and Dutch 
publishers: 166.  
Triangulate data on events, relational context, and knowledge 
base; gather evidence of cognitive framing.  
Internal Documents Internal company documents such as product leaflets, presentations, press 
announcements, and reports, collected from websites, libraries, and the 
archives of informants: 43. 
Triangulate data on events, relational context, and knowledge 
base; provide clues of cognitive framing.  
Academic 
Publications and 
Patents 
Academic (technical) publications by involved researchers, covering the 
analysis period: 185. 
Triangulate data on relational context and knowledge base. 
 Patents on FML inventions, covering the analysis period: 43. Triangulate data on relational context and knowledge base. 
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TABLE II 
Roles of Involved Interviewees and Organizations 
Involved Organization Interviewee Position(s) (ID) Role in the Development of FML 
3M (1981–1995) Sales Manager (20M) Supplying adhesive and prepregs, funding joint 
research and sharing knowledge about 3M 
adhesives and prepregs. 
Aerohybrids (2009– ) President (6L; 3 interviews) 
Sales Manager (8T; 2 interviews) 
Joint venture of GTM and Werco Manufacturing. 
Producing Glare and developing new Glare 
variants in cooperation with GTM. 
Airbus (including Aérospatiale, 
MBB and DASA) (1988–) 
Program Director A380 (9A) 
Designer (11A) 
Performing joint FML studies for various 
applications, especially the A380. Once Glare was 
selected for the A380, also heavily involved in 
developing production knowledge with FMLC, 
Stork Fokker, and TU Delft.  
Akzo (1981–1999) Advisor (13Z) 
Development Engineer (17T) 
Sales Manager (28Z) 
Funding FML development at TU Delft and NLR, 
supplying fibers and fiber knowledge, setting up 
internal Glare R&D department, patenting FML, 
and participating in SLC. 
Alcoa (1981–1995; 2004–2010) Program Director (9A) 
Technical Director (3L; 2 interviews) 
Funding FML development at TU Delft and GTM, 
supplying aluminum and aluminum knowledge, 
production of Arall using Akzo’s license, 
marketing and sales of Arall, participating in SLC. 
Aviation Equipment (1995–) Commercial Director (6L; 3 interviews) Production of Glare for several secondary 
applications, using SLC/Alcoa’s license and 
knowledge from (former) SLC employees. 
Boeing (including de Havilland) 
(1991–1995)  
Development Engineer (12B; 2 interviews) 
Development Engineer (25O; 2 interviews) 
Preparing application of Glare on 777 and Dash-8, 
in close cooperation with TU Delft and SLC.  
Bombardier (including de 
Havilland and Shorts) (1996–
2005) 
Development Engineer (12B; 2 interviews) 
Technical Director (16B; 2 interviews) 
Performing joint FML studies, application on 
Learjet 45, preparing application on the C-series 
aircraft with Stork Fokker. 
Delft University of Technology 
(TU Delft) (1978–) 
Dean (5N) 
Assistant Professor (19T) 
Associate Professor (8T; 2 interviews) 
Professor (29T; 3 interviews) 
Professor (18T) 
Fundamental materials research, research and 
development, testing FML, training new engineers 
and providing knowledge to other partners. 
DFVLR (1987) Development Engineer (14T) Joint research and testing of FML (with TU Delft 
and Alcoa).  
FMLC (2001–) CEO (8T; 2 interviews) 
Development Engineer (17T) 
Development Engineer (23F) 
Coordinating joint testing activities and acquiring 
government funding to perform FML studies. 
Fokker/Stork Fokker (1978–) R&D Manager (26F; 2 interviews) 
Aerospace Director (4F) 
Chief Engineer (10R) 
Designer (11A) 
Sales Director (13Z) 
Development Engineer (23F) 
Production Manager (24F) 
Development Manager (27S; 2 interviews) 
R&D Manager (2F) 
Multiple joint development and testing activities, 
preparing application on Fokker 50 with TU Delft, 
production of Glare (with Airbus).  
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Involved Organization Interviewee Position(s) (ID) Role in the Development of FML 
Program Manager (30F; 2 interviews) 
Program Manager (27S; 2 interviews) 
Garuda Airlines (1994–1997) Maintenance Manager (21G) Glare studies with TU Delft and SLC; joint 
applications on DC-10. 
Global Technics (2005–) Commercial Director (30F; 2 interviews) 
Technical Director (11A) 
Design, development and engineering of Glare in 
cooperation with Airbus; providing design 
knowledge.  
GTM (2004–) CEO (8T; 2 interviews) 
Technical Director (17T) 
Development and testing of Glare in cooperation 
with Alcoa, TU Delft, and Airbus; providing 
material and development knowledge. 
McDonnell Douglas (1988–1995) Program Manager (15D) Jointly testing of a Glare application on the C130 
(with SLC). 
NIVR (Netherlands Agency for 
Aerospace Programs) (1983–) 
Project manager (1N; 2 interviews) 
CEO (5N) 
Funding Dutch R&D on FML, no knowledge 
transfer. 
NLR (Dutch aerospace laboratory) 
(1978–) 
General Director (1OR) 
Test Engineer (22R) 
Testing and certification of FML products, in 
cooperation with Fokker, TU Delft, SLC, and 
Airbus, providing testing knowledge. 
SLC (later SLI) (1991–1997) CEO (6L; 3 interviews) 
Technical Director (8T; 2 interviews) 
Board Member (13Z) 
Development Engineer (17T) 
Development Engineer (23F) 
Development Engineer (25O; 2 interviews) 
Sales Representative (28Z)  
Joint venture Akzo and Alcoa, developing, testing, 
applying, and marketing Glare and Arall, in 
cooperation with almost all FML network 
partners. 
U.S. Air Force (1995–) Researcher (7U) Retro-fit Glare applications on C130 and study 
applications on other aircraft in cooperation with 
TU Delft, SLC, Alcoa, and GTM. 
Werco Manufacturing (2009-) Business Developer (6L; 3 interviews) Develop, produce, and market FML products in 
cooperation with GTM. 
   
Note: Multiple interviewees worked simultaneously or successively for more than one company in the FML network.  
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FIGURE I 
Data Structure 
Sending knowledge to other organizations, e.g., reports, papers and leaflets. 
Requesting knowledge from other organizations, e.g., asking for a report or specification.
Stimulate others to share knowledge or to work together on developing knowledge, e.g., 
by co-locating people from two organizations.  
Initiating or intensifying 
knowledge sharing
Empirical Observations Theoretical Observations Theoretical Categories
Reducing knowledge trading
Initiating knowledge trading
Reducing or terminating 
knowledge sharing 
Only share some superficial knowledge and hide the details, e.g., in a report. 
Stop and forbid sharing knowledge, e.g., by removing pages with detailed information 
from a leaflet.
End, forbid and discourage joint knowledge development, e.g., by putting a moratorium 
on particular technical studies. 
File a patent and sell the patent or licenses to other organizations.
Create an IPR sharing structure, for instance in the form of a joint venture.  
Buy licenses or patents from other organizations.
File a patent and do not sell or transfer the patent or license to other organizations.
Not extending a license agreement with another organization.
Accumulated stock of tacit 
knowledge
Contractual governance 
mechanisms
Prior relationships
Developing 
knowledge base
Mentioning active or dormant relationships with another organization (or individual in that 
organization) as important for the knowledge sharing interaction, e.g., in a dissertation. 
Contractual agreement with another organization dealing with the knowledge sharing 
interaction, e.g., an non-disclosure agreement or exclusivity agreement.
Existing knowledge development trajectory of an organization, expressed in for instance 
their existing products (e.g., the aluminum bonding technology used in Bombardier 
aircraft).  
Past investments in a particular technology in terms of research, employees and/or 
dedicated equipment.
Evolving relational 
context
Formal appropriabilityOwning IPR in the form of patents and/or licenses. 
Deciding about 
engaging in 
interorganizational
knowledge transfer
Internal: strategy changes
Event triggering 
(re)framing
Changes in leadership in the company which influence knowledg transfer activities.
Explicit strategy reorientations related to the knowledge transfer activities. 
External: market/supply 
changes
Changes in the potential applications of the material (e.g., an aircraf program that is 
cancelled).
Changes in competition related to the innovation (e.g., a competitor applying a competing 
technology).
Endogenous: results of 
knowledge transfer 
Positive and negative results from the knowledge transfer activities which impact the 
application possibilities (e.g., material appears not to be suitable for wings).
Expressing a focus on a particular aircraft program to sell the product or material (e.g., 
the Fokker 100). 
Considering a particular market or market segment (e.g., aircraft wings) as a potential 
outlet for a new material. 
(Re)framing 
innovation
Framing as opportunity
Targeting a particular aircraft program (e.g., the update of the Fokker 100 or the Saab 
2000), but the program is postponed, adjusted or cancelled. 
Considering a particular market or market segment (e.g., aircraft wings) no longer as a 
potential outlet for a product. 
Unframing as opportunity
Considering a technology development as a threat to current and/or future sales. Framing as threat
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TABLE III 
Analyzed Knowledge Transfer Interactions of Alcoa 
Interaction 
Event Triggering 
(Re)Framing (Re)Framing Innovation 
Deciding About Engaging in 
Interorganizational 
Knowledge Transfer 
Evolving Relational 
Context 
Developing Knowledge 
Base 
1 Endogenous: The FML 
technology is ready for 
first application on real 
aircraft prototypes.  
Opportunity: Alcoa 
managers frame an 
opportunity to create 
monetary value by 
applications of FML on 
wings for existing 
relationships. 
Initiate sharing: Alcoa 
managers start sharing 
knowledge to potential 
customers such as MDC, 
Boeing, Aérospatiale, and 
Bombardier and hosts a 
conference to convince them 
about FML. 
Prior relationships: 
Existing relationships and 
Alcoa’s reputation as a 
major aluminum supplier 
help interest current 
customers in this new 
technology. 
 
Formal appropriability and 
stock of tacit knowledge: 
Alcoa’s exclusive license 
on Arall and unique tacit 
production knowledge 
reduce risks of sharing 
knowledge with 
customers.  
2 Endogenous: Akzo/TU 
Delft’s actions to 
convince the aircraft 
community about Glare, 
reduces the status of 
Arall and conflicts with 
Alcoa’s aims. 
Threat: Alcoa managers 
perceive the actions of 
Akzo and TU Delft as a 
threat. 
Reduce sharing: Alcoa 
managers resist knowledge 
sharing with customers 
around Glare. 
Prior relationships: 
Alcoa’s strong 
commercial network in 
the aircraft industry 
enables it to continue 
with the ‘old’ Arall 
technology.  
Lack of formal 
appropriability: Alcoa 
does not have a license on 
Glare technology and thus 
is not able to protect value 
appropriation. 
3 Internal strategy change: 
Alcoa appoints a new 
vice president to the 
aerospace division, from 
its profitable sheets and 
plate aluminum division, 
who emphasizes existing 
profitable products over 
new technology 
development. 
Threat: Alcoa managers 
perceive Glare to be a 
threat to the creation and 
appropriation of monetary 
value from aluminum 
with existing customers. 
 
Reduce sharing (and force 
others to do so): Alcoa 
managers wind down its 
knowledge sharing with 
Boeing and MDC through 
SLC and asks Boeing to stop 
working on FML. 
Prior relationships and 
contractual governance 
mechanisms: Long-
standing relationships 
and existing contracts of 
Alcoa and Boeing with 
MDC enable Alcoa to 
influence the behaviors 
of Boeing and MDC.  
Formal appropriability: 
Through its majority 
ownership of SLC, Alcoa 
controls FML IPR.  
4 External market changes: 
Fokker files for 
bankruptcy, and Saab 
and McDonnell Douglas 
lose interest in FML. 
Unframing opportunity: 
The opportunity of an 
application on a Fokker 
aircraft disappears. Alcoa 
managers unframe an 
opportunity to create 
value from further FML 
development.  
Terminate sharing, initiate 
trading: Alcoa managers 
stop investing in FML and 
ends collaboration with 
Akzo. Alcoa keeps the 
patents and sells licenses for 
European and secondary 
applications to Akzo and 
Aviation Equipment.  
 Formal appropriability: 
Alcoa owns a majority of 
SLC and is also majority 
owner of the patents.  
5 External market change: 
Airbus selects Glare for 
the A380 and Boeing 
decides to develop a full-
composite aircraft (the 
787).  
Opportunity: Alcoa 
managers frame a 
renewed opportunity to 
create value from FML, as 
competitor of composites.  
Initiate sharing: Alcoa 
managers invite FMLC and 
former Airbus employees to 
share and co-develop FML 
variants.  
Prior relationships: 
Individual Alcoa 
employees have 
maintained their 
relationships with FMLC 
employees. 
Formal appropriability: 
Alcoa still owns FML 
patents. 
6 Endogenous: Alcoa and 
GTM cooperate on FML.  
Threat: Alcoa managers 
frame a threat that 
competitors could benefit 
from the new FML 
technology they are 
developing.  
Reduce sharing: 
Alcoa managers protect the 
outcomes of collaboration 
between GTM and Alcoa 
through trade secrets and 
shared patents; this 
knowledge is not traded. 
Prior relationships and 
contractual governance 
mechanisms: Alcoa and 
GTM agree on tight and 
exclusive cooperation, 
which hides the results 
of the joint developments 
from the outside world.  
Formal appropriability: 
Alcoa files new FML 
patents with GTM, which 
enable it to appropriate the 
value from the innovation 
development.  
7 Internal strategy change: 
Alcoa’s management 
decides that FML does 
not fit the business. 
External market change: 
The development of the 
Boeing 787 and Airbus 
A380 show problems 
with the new materials, 
and thus a reduced threat 
for aluminum.  
Threat: Alcoa managers no 
longer frame FML as an 
opportunity but as a threat 
to value creation from 
aluminum. 
Terminate sharing: Alcoa 
managers end joint program 
with GTM and other 
interested parties and blocks 
primary FML applications in 
the US. 
 Formal appropriability: 
Alcoa owns fundamental 
FML patents and can 
block primary FML 
applications in the US. 
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TABLE IV 
Analyzed Knowledge Transfer Interactions of Bombardier 
Interaction 
Event Triggering 
(Re)Framing (Re)Framing Innovation 
Deciding About Engaging in 
Interorganizational 
Knowledge Transfer 
Evolving Relational 
Context 
Developing Knowledge 
Base 
      
1 External: The positive 
Glare results awake 
interest at Bombardier. 
Internal: A new aircraft 
program is under 
development. 
Opportunity: Bombardier 
engineers frame an 
opportunity to create 
value using Glare in its 
aircraft (e.g., Learjet 45).  
Initiate sharing: Bombardier 
and SLC start co-developing 
applications for Bombardier 
aircraft. 
Prior relationships: 
Bombardier and SLC 
employees have 
cooperated before.  
Stock of tacit knowledge: 
Glare fits Bombardier’s 
history with bonded 
aluminum. 
2 Endogenous: Glare 
production technology is 
successfully applied on 
the Learjet 45. 
Internal: A new aircraft 
program is started. 
Opportunity: Bombardier 
engineers frame an 
opportunity to create 
value from applying Glare 
on its new C-series 
aircraft.  
Initiate sharing: Bombardier 
managers re-start knowledge 
sharing with FMLC. 
Prior relationships: 
Bombardier employees 
have cooperated with 
FMLC employees in the 
past.  
Stock of tacit knowledge: 
FML would nicely fit 
Bombardier’s production 
capabilities. 
 
 
TABLE V 
Analyzed Knowledge Transfer Interactions of Airbus 
Interaction 
Event Triggering 
(Re)Framing (Re)Framing Innovation 
Deciding About Engaging in 
Interorganizational 
Knowledge Transfer 
Evolving Relational 
Context 
Developing Knowledge 
Base 
1 External: MBB 
researchers learn about 
the FML technology, 
which is ready for first 
application on real 
aircraft prototypes. 
Opportunity: MBB 
researchers frame an 
opportunity to apply FML 
on a new generation of 
aircraft.  
Initiate sharing: MBB 
engineers contact TU Delft 
researchers. 
 Stock of tacit knowledge: 
The MBB engineers have 
some knowledge of the 
new materials. 
2 Endogenous: SLC 
engineers intensify 
knowledge sharing with 
Aérospatiale. 
Threat: Aérospatiale 
managers frame a threat 
of competitors 
appropriating value from 
this FML development.  
Reduce sharing: Aérospatiale 
managers forbid SLC from 
disclosing the results of the 
cooperative innovation 
activities via an NDA. 
Prior relationships: 
Aérospatiale employees 
had prior interactions 
and ongoing cooperation 
with TU Delft and SLC, 
and these parties want to 
continue.  
 
3 Endogenous: Airbus is 
involved in the 
development and testing 
of Glare.  
Opportunity: Akzo, TU 
Delft, Stork Fokker, and 
Airbus employees frame 
opportunities to create 
value using Glare on the 
Airbus A3XX, backed by 
public funding. 
Intensify sharing: Akzo, TU 
Delft, Stork Fokker, and 
Airbus employees increase 
knowledge sharing to further 
develop and test the 
envisaged parts and develop 
production knowledge.  
Prior relationships: TU 
Delft, Akzo, and Stork 
Fokker have strong 
relationships with 
Airbus, which make 
good cooperation 
possible. 
Formal appropriability: 
Akzo owns a license for 
European applications of 
Glare, which also enables 
Airbus to use and exploit 
the FML technology. 
4 Endogenous: Airbus, 
Akzo, Stork Fokker, and 
TU Delft engage in 
intensive knowledge 
sharing. 
Threat: Airbus managers 
perceive a threat that 
competitors (i.e., Boeing) 
will appropriate value 
from the unique FML 
material if knowledge 
leaks to those 
competitors.  
Reduce sharing: Airbus 
managers restrict sharing 
knowledge with other parties 
by only sharing generic 
results and no details; in the 
cooperation, exact details are 
not disclosed to all parties. 
  
5 Endogenous: Airbus and 
Stork Fokker sign a 
cooperation agreement. 
Threat: Airbus managers 
perceives competitors like 
Boeing attaining 
knowledge about Glare as 
a threat to value 
appropriation. 
Reduce sharing: Airbus 
managers block knowledge 
sharing to parties outside the 
direct cooperation, such as 
by contractual agreements. 
Contractual governance 
mechanisms: Airbus 
managers signed 
contracts with the 
involved parties like 
Stork Fokker.  
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 FIGURE II 
A Model Explaining Dynamics of Interorganizational Knowledge Transfer Interactions 
 
 
   
                           
                           
                               
                                  
          
                                    
 
                       
                         
                  
                            
                                      
                                           
                                          
                           
                           
                          
                            
                        
                                 
                
                           
                   
                         
          
                            
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                             
